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Abstract—We consider the problem of reinforcing federated
learning with formal privacy guarantees. We propose to employ
Bayesian differential privacy, a relaxation of differential privacy
for similarly distributed data, to provide sharper privacy loss
bounds. We adapt the Bayesian privacy accounting method to
the federated setting and suggest multiple improvements for more
efficient privacy budgeting at different levels. Our experiments
show significant advantage over the state-of-the-art differential
privacy bounds for federated learning on image classification
tasks, including a medical application, bringing the privacy
budget below ε = 1 at the client level, and below ε = 0.1 at
the instance level. Lower amounts of noise also benefit the model
accuracy and reduce the number of communication rounds.
Index Terms—federated learning, differential privacy, privacy
accounting, deep learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of data analytics and machine learning (ML)
presents countless opportunities for companies, governments
and individuals to benefit from the accumulated data. At
the same time, their ability to capture fine levels of detail
potentially compromises privacy of data providers. Recent
research [1], [2] suggests that even in a black-box setting it is
possible to argue about the presence of individual records in
the training set or recover certain features of these records.
To tackle this problem a number of solutions has been
proposed. They vary in how privacy is achieved and to what
extent data is protected. One approach that assumes privacy
at its core is federated learning (FL) [3]. In the FL setting,
a central entity (server) trains a model on user data without
actually copying data from user devices. Instead, users (clients)
update models locally, and the server aggregates these updates.
In spite of all the advantages, federated learning does not
provide theoretical privacy guarantees, like it is done by differ-
ential privacy (DP) [4], which is viewed by many researchers
as the privacy gold standard. Initially, DP algorithms focused
on sanitising simple statistics, such as mean, median, etc.,
using a technique known as output perturbation. In recent
years, the field made a lot of progress towards the goal
of privacy-preserving machine learning, through works on
objective perturbation [5], stochastic gradient descend with DP
updates [6], to more complex and practical methods [7]–[10].
As shown in recent work [10], [11], the two approaches
can be combined to provide joint benefits. However, unless
the number of users is exceedingly high (e.g. in the scenario
of a large population of mobile users considered in [10]),
differentially private federated learning provides only weak
guarantees. Contrary to a wide-spread opinion in machine
learning community, values of ε close to 10 can hardly be
seen as reassurance to a user: for certain types of attacks, an
adversary can theoretically reach accuracy of 99.99%.
We propose to augment federated learning with a natural
relaxation of differential privacy, called Bayesian differential
privacy (BDP) [12], that provides tighter, and thus, more
meaningful guarantees. The main idea of this relaxation is
based on the observation that machine learning tasks are often
restricted to a particular type of data (for example, finding a
film review in the MRI dataset is very unlikely). Moreover, this
information, and potentially even some prior distribution of
data, is often available to the attacker. While the traditional DP
treats all data as equally likely and hides differences by large
amounts of noise, BDP calibrates noise to the data distribution.
Hence, for any two datasets drawn from the same (arbitrary)
distribution, and given the same privacy mechanism with the
same amount of noise, BDP provides tighter guarantees than
DP. Note that the full knowledge of this distribution is not
required, as the necessary statistics can be estimated from data.
We introduce the notion of Bayesian differential privacy in
Section IV and extend it to the federated learning setting in
Section V. Our experiments (see Section VI) show significant
advantage, both in privacy guarantees and the model quality.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• we adapt the notion of Bayesian differential privacy to
federated learning, including more natural non-i.i.d. set-
tings (Section V-A), to provide strong theoretical privacy
guarantees under minor and practical assumptions;
• we propose a novel joint accounting method for estimat-
ing client-level and instance-level privacy simultaneously
and securely (Section V-C);
• we experimentally demonstrate advantages of our
method, such as shrinking the privacy budget to a fraction
of the previous state-of-the-art, and improving the accu-
racy of the trained models by up to 10% (Section VI).978-1-7281-0858-2/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
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II. RELATED WORK
As machine learning applications become more and more
common, various vulnerabilities and attacks on ML models get
discovered, based on both passive (for example, model inver-
sion [1] and membership inference [2]) and active adversaries
(e.g. [13]), raising the need for developing matching defences.
Differential privacy [4], [14] is one of the strongest privacy
standards that can be employed to protect ML models from
these and other attacks. Since pure ε-DP is hard to achieve
in many realistic learning settings, a notion of approximate
(ε, δ)-DP is used across-the-board in machine learning. It is
often achieved as a result of applying the Gaussian noise
mechanism [15].
For a long time, however, even approximate DP remained
unachievable in more popular deep learning scenarios. Some
earlier attempts [16] led to prohibitively high bounds on ε [7],
[8] that were later shown to be ineffective against attacks [13].
A major step in the direction of bringing privacy loss values
down to more practical magnitudes was done by [7] with the
introduction of the moments accountant, currently a state-of-
the-art method for keeping track of the privacy loss during
training. Followed by improvements in differentially private
training techniques [8], [9], it allowed to achieve single-
digit DP guarantees (ε < 10) for classic supervised learning
benchmarks, such as MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR.
On the other end of spectrum, McMahan et al. [3] proposed
federated learning as one possible solution to privacy issues
(among other problems, such as scalability and communication
costs). In this setting, privacy is enforced by keeping data
on user devices and only submitting model updates to the
server. Two of the popular approaches are the federated
stochastic gradient descent (FedSGD) and federated averaging
(FedAvg) [3], where clients do local on-device gradient
descent using their data, then send these updates to the server,
which applies an average update to the model. Privacy can
further be enhanced by using secure multi-party computation
(MPC) [17] to allow the server access only average updates of
a big group of users and not individual ones. However, MPC or
homomorphic encryption do not guarantee robustness against
model inversion or membership inference [1], [2], because
these attacks operate on the resulting model which remains
the same. Alternatively, by using differential privacy and the
moments accountant, [10] and [11] attained theoretical client-
level privacy guarantees for federated learning settings.
Since federated learning on its own lacks theoretical privacy
guarantees, combining it with a more formal notion of privacy
is an attractive direction of research. On the other hand, for
more complicated deep learning models, differential privacy
leads to a poor privacy-utility trade-off, suggesting that pairing
federated learning with an alternative notion might prove
beneficial.
Apart from differential privacy, a number of alternative
definitions have been proposed over the recent years, such as
computational DP [18], mutual-information privacy [19], [20],
different versions of concentrated DP (CDP [21], zCDP [22],
tCDP [23]), and Re´nyi DP (RDP) [24]. Some other relax-
ations [25]–[27] tip the balance even further in favour of
applicability at the cost of weaker guarantees, for example
considering the average-case instead of the worst-case [28].
In general, important aspects of a privacy notion are
composability, accountability, and interpretability. Apart from
sharp bounds, the moments accountant is attractive because
it operates within the classic notion of (ε, δ)-DP. Some of
the alternative notions of DP also provide tight composition
theorems, along with some other advantages, but to the best of
our knowledge, they are not broadly used in practice compared
to traditional DP (although there are some examples [29]). One
of the possible reasons for that is interpretability: parameters
of (α, ε)-RDP or (µ, τ)-CDP are hard to interpret. While it
may be difficult to quantify the actual guarantee provided by
specific values of ε, δ of the traditional DP, it is still advanta-
geous that they have a clearer probabilistic interpretation.
In this work, we rely on another relaxation, called Bayesian
differential privacy [12]. This notion boosts privacy accounting
efficiency by utilising the fact that data come from a partic-
ular distribution, and not all data are equally likely. At the
same time, it maintains the probabilistic interpretation of its
parameters ε and δ. It is worth noting, that unlike some of
the relaxations mentioned above, the notion of Bayesian DP
provides the worst-case guarantee (under specified conditions)
and is not limited to a particular dataset, but rather a particular
type of data (e.g. emails, MRI images, etc.), or a mixture of
such types, which is a much more permitting assumption.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide necessary definitions, back-
ground and notation used in the paper. We also describe the
general setting of the problem.
A. Definitions and notation
We use D,D′ to represent neighbouring (adjacent) datasets.
If not specified, it is assumed that these datasets differ in a
single example. Individual examples in a dataset are denoted
by x or xi, while the example by which two datasets differ—
by x′. We assume D′ = D ∪ {x′}, whenever possible to do
so without loss of generality.
Since this paper mainly deals with adding noise to gradients
(w.r.t. model parameters, neural network weights, etc.), we of-
ten refer to non-noised gradients as non-private outcome, and
denote it by g, g′. The private learning outcomes are denoted
by w. Whenever it is ambiguous, we denote expectation over
data (or equivalently, gradients) as Ex, and over the learning
outcomes as Ew. Finally, for federated learning scenarios, ui
indicates an update of a user i, while U—a set of all user
updates.
Definition 1. A randomised function (algorithm) A : D → R
with domain D and rangeR satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy
if for any two adjacent inputs D,D′ ∈ D and for any set of
outcomes S ⊂ R the following holds:
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
Definition 2. The privacy loss LA of a randomised algorithm
A : D → R for outcome w ∈ R and datasets D,D′ ∈ D is
given by:
LA(w,D,D′) = log
Pr [A(D) = w]
Pr [A(D′) = w] .
For notational simplicity, we omit the designation A, i.e.
we use L(w,D,D′) (or simply L) for the privacy loss random
variable, and p(w|D), and p(w|D′) for the outcome probabil-
ity distributions for given datasets. Also, note that the privacy
loss random variable L is distributed by drawing w ∼ p(w|D)
(see [21, Section 2.1 and Definition 3.1]), which helps linking
it to well-known divergences.
Definition 3. The Gaussian noise mechanism achieving (ε, δ)-
DP, for a function f : D → Rm, is defined as
M(D) = f(D) +N (0, Iσ2),
where σ > C
√
2 log 1.25δ /ε and C = maxD,D′ ‖f(D) −
f(D′)‖ is the L2-sensitivity of f .
For more details on differential privacy and the Gaussian
mechanism, we refer the reader to [15].
We will also need the definition of Re´nyi divergence:
Definition 4. Re´nyi divergence of order λ between distribu-
tions P and Q, denoted as Dλ(P‖Q) is defined as
Dλ(P‖Q) = 1
λ− 1 log
∫
p(x)
[
p(x)
q(x)
]λ−1
dx
=
1
λ− 1 log
∫
q(x)
[
p(x)
q(x)
]λ
dx,
where p(x) and q(x) are corresponding density functions of
P and Q.
Analytic expressions for Re´nyi divergence exist for many
common distributions and can be found in [30]. Van Erven
and Harremos [31] provide a good survey of Re´nyi divergence
properties in general.
B. Setting
In the first part of the paper, while describing the concept of
Bayesian differential privacy, we consider a general iterative
learning algorithm, such that each iteration t produces a non-
private learning outcome x(t) (e.g. a gradient over a batch of
data). In the second half of the paper, we consider the equiv-
alent federated learning setting, where each communication
round t produces a set of non-private learning outcomes u(t)i ,
one for each client i.
The non-private outcome, in both scenarios, gets trans-
formed into a private learning outcome w(t) that is used as
a starting point for the next iteration or communication round.
The learning outcome can be made private by different means,
but in this work we consider the most common approach of
applying an additive noise mechanism (e.g. a Gaussian noise
mechanism). We denote the distribution of private outcomes
by p(w(t)|w(t−1), D) (we assume the Markov property of the
learning process for brevity of notation, but it is not necessary
in general) or p(w(t)|w(t−1),U), depending on the scenario.
The process can run on subsamples of data or subsets
of clients, in which case w(t) comes from the distribution
p(w(t)|w(t−1), B(t)), where B(t) is a batch of data used
for parameters update in iteration t, or p(w(t)|w(t−1),U(t)),
where U(t) is a set of updates from users participating in the
communication round t. In these cases, privacy is amplified
through sampling [32].
For each iteration, we would like to compute a quantity ct
(we call it a privacy cost) that accumulates over the learn-
ing process and allows to compute privacy loss bounds ε, δ
using concentration inequalities. The overall privacy account-
ing workflow does not significantly differ from prior work,
but is in fact a generalisation of the well-known moments
accountant [7]. Importantly, it is not tied to a specific learning
algorithm or a class of algorithms, as long as one can map it
to the above setting.
C. Motivation
Before we proceed, we find it important to motivate the
research and usage of alternative definitions of privacy. The
primary reason for this is that the complexity of the concept
of differential privacy often leads to misunderstanding or
overestimation of the guarantees it provides. And while we
do not fully tackle the problem of interpretability, we provide
a simple example below that allows to better judge the quality
of provided guarantees.
Consider the state-of-the-art differentially private machine
learning models [7], [9]. In order to come close to the non-
private accuracy (say within 10% of it), all of the reported
models stretch their privacy budget to ε > 2 (for a reasonably
low δ), while in many cases it goes up to ε > 5. In real-world
applications, it can even be larger than 101. These numbers
seem small, and thus, may often be overlooked. But let us
present an alternative interpretation.
What we are interested in is the change in the posterior
distribution of the attacker after they see the private model
compared to prior [24], [33]. Let us consider the stronger,
pure DP for simplicity. According to the definition of ε-DP:
p(D|w)
p(D′|w) ≤ e
ε p(D)
p(D′)
.
Assume the following specific example. The datasets D,D′
consist of income values for residents of a small town. There
is one individual x′ whose income is orders of magnitude
higher than the rest, and whose residency in the town is what
the attacker wishes to infer. The attacker observes the mean
income w sanitised by a differentially private mechanism with
ε = ε0. If the individual is not present in the dataset, the
probability of w being above a certain threshold is extremely
small. On the contrary, if x′ is present, this probability is
higher (say it is equal to r). The attacker takes a Bayesian
approach, computes the likelihood of the observed value
1https://www.wired.com/story/apple-differential-privacy-shortcomings/
under each of the two assumptions and the corresponding
posteriors given a flat prior. The attacker then concludes that
the individual is present in the dataset and is a resident.
By the above expression, r can only be eε0 times larger than
the corresponding probability without x′. But if the re−ε0 is
small enough, then the probability P (A) of the attacker’s guess
being correct is as high as r
r+re−ε0 or, equivalently,
P (A) =
1
1 + e−ε
. (1)
To put it in perspective, for a DP algorithm with ε = 5,
the upper bound on the accuracy of this attack is as high as
99.33%. For ε = 8, it is 99.97%. For ε = 10, 99.995%.
Remember that we used an uninformative flat prior, and for a
more informed attacker these numbers could be even larger.
In a more realistic scenario, even without any privacy
protection, this high accuracy is not likely to be achieved
by the attacker. So such guarantee is hardly better than no
guarantee, and cannot be seen as reassuring. Thus, we want
to encourage the discussion and search for more meaningful
privacy definitions or DP relaxations for machine learning and
federated learning. One such relaxation we present and explore
in this paper.
IV. BAYESIAN DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we describe Bayesian differential privacy
(BDP), accompanied by a practical privacy loss accounting
method. We restate just the main results necessary for the fol-
lowing section, while all the details, proofs and experimental
evaluation of BDP can be found in [12].
Definition 5. A randomised function (algorithm) A : D → R
with domain D and range R satisfies (ε, δ)-Bayesian differ-
ential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ D,
differing in a single data point x′ ∼ p(x), and for any set of
outcomes S ⊂ R the following holds:
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δ, (2)
To derive tighter sequential composition, we use an alter-
native definition that implies the above:
Pr[L(w,D,D′) ≥ ε] ≤ δ, (3)
where probability is taken over the randomness of the outcome
w and the additional example x′.
This definition is very close to the original definition of DP,
except that it also takes into account the randomness of x′.
Hence, the basic properties are similar to those of DP, although
BDP does not provide guarantees in all the scenarios where
DP does (e.g. when the distribution p(x) is non-stationary, it
is possible that BDP underestimates the actual privacy loss).
While Definition 5 does not specify the distribution of any
point in the dataset other than the additional example x′,
it is natural and convenient to assume that all examples in
the dataset are drawn from the same distribution p(x). This
holds in many real-world applications, including all applica-
tions evaluated in this paper, and it allows using sampling
techniques instead of requiring knowing the true distribution.
We also assume that all data points are exchangeable [34],
i.e. any permutation of data points has the same joint proba-
bility. It enables tighter accounting for iterative mechanisms,
and is naturally satisfied in the considered scenarios.
Since basic composition is not enough to provide tight
privacy bounds for iterative federated learning algorithms
in which we are interested, let us present two theorems,
generalising upon the moments accountant routine. We use
it as a foundation for the privacy accounting framework for
federated learning presented in the next section.
Theorem 1 (Advanced Composition). Let a learning algo-
rithm run for T iterations. Denote by w(1) . . . w(T ) a sequence
of private learning outcomes obtained at iterations 1, . . . , T ,
and L(1:T ) the corresponding total privacy loss. Then,
E
[
eλL
(1:T )
]
=
T∏
t=1
Ex
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
,
where pt = p(w(t)|w(t−1), D), qt = p(w(t)|w(t−1), D′), and
Dλ+1(pt‖qt) is Re´nyi divergence between pt and qt.
We denote the logarithm of the quantity inside the product
in Theorem 1 as ct(λ) and call it the privacy cost of the
iteration, or communication round, t:
ct(λ) = logE
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
(4)
The privacy cost of the whole learning process is then a
sum of the costs of each iteration.
Theorem 2. Let the algorithm produce a sequence of private
learning outcomes w(1) . . . w(T ) using a known probability
distribution p(w(t)|w(t−1), D). Then, ε and δ are related as
log δ ≤
T∑
t=1
ct(λ)− λε.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions above, for a fixed δ:
ε ≤ 1
λ
T∑
t=1
ct(λ)− 1
λ
log δ.
Theorem 2 provides an efficient privacy accounting algo-
rithm. During training, we compute the privacy cost ct(λ)
for each iteration t, accumulate it, and then use to compute
ε, δ pair. This process is ideologically close to that of the
moment accountant, but accumulates a different quantity (note
the change from the privacy loss random variable to Re´nyi
divergence and expectation over data).
Computing ct(λ) precisely requires access to the prior
distribution of data p(x), which is unrealistic. Therefore,
we need an estimator for E[eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)]. Moreover, since
Chernoff bound, which our Theorem 2 is based on, only holds
for the true expectation value, we have to take into account
the estimator error. To solve this, we employ a Bayesian view
of the estimation problem [35] and use the upper confidence
bound of the expectation estimator.
Let us define the following m-sample estimator of ct(λ):
cˆt(λ) = log
[
M(t) +
F−1(1− δ′,m− 1)√
m− 1 S(t)
]
, (5)
where M(t) and S(t) are the sample mean and the sample
standard deviation of eλDˆ
(t)
λ+1 , F−1(1−δ′,m−1) is the inverse
of the Student’s t-distribution CDF at 1−δ′ with m−1 degrees
of freedom, and
Dˆ
(t)
λ+1 = max {Dλ+1(pˆt‖qˆt), Dλ+1(qˆt‖pˆt)} ,
pˆt = p(w
(t) | w(t−1), B(t)),
qˆt = p(w
(t) | w(t−1), B(t) \ {xi}).
One can show that, for continuous distributions pˆt and qˆt,
cˆt(λ) overestimates the true privacy cost ct(λ) with probability
1− δ′. Therefore, the probability of underestimation δ′ can be
fixed upfront and incorporated in δ.
Remark 1. This step changes the interpretation of δ in
Bayesian differential privacy compared to the traditional DP.
Apart from the probability of the privacy loss exceeding ε,
e.g. in the tails of its distribution, it also incorporates our
uncertainty about the true data distribution (in other words,
the probability of underestimating the true expectation because
of not observing enough data samples). It can be intuitively
understood as accounting for unlikely or unobserved data in
δ, rather than in ε by adding more noise.
Remark 2. For discrete outcomes, a different estimator needs
to be derived to meet the same bound. The process of obtaining
it is identical to the one above, with the only change in the
maximum entropy distribution.
Remark 3. There are other differences compared to the classic
DP, such as allowance for unbounded sensitivity or estimator
privacy, that are not discussed in this work. More details can
be found in [12].
Gaussian Noise Mechanism. Consider the subsampled
Gaussian noise mechanism [15]. The outcome distribution
p(w(t) | w(t−1), D) in this case is the mixture of two Gaussians
(1−q)N (gt, σ2)+qN (g′t, σ2), where gt and g′t are non-private
outcomes at the iteration t (e.g. gradients), σ is the noise
parameter, and q is the data sampling probability. Plugging the
outcome distribution into the formula for Re´nyi divergence, we
get the following result for the privacy cost.
Theorem 3. Given the Gaussian noise mechanism with the
noise parameter σ and subsampling probability q, the privacy
cost for λ ∈ N at iteration t can be expressed as
ct(λ) = max{cLt (λ), cRt (λ)},
where
cLt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ+1,q)
[
e
k2−k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
,
cRt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ,q)
[
e
k2+k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t|2
]]
,
and B(λ, q) is the binomial distribution with λ experiments
and the probability of success q.
V. FEDERATED LEARNING WITH BAYESIAN
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we adapt the Bayesian differential privacy
framework and its accounting method to guarantee the client-
level privacy, the level most frequently addressed in the litera-
ture. We then justify and explore the instance-level privacy
and two different techniques for accounting it. Finally, we
propose a method to jointly account instance-level and client-
level privacy for the FedSGD algorithm in order to provide
the strongest trade-off between utility and privacy guarantees.
A. Client privacy
When it comes to reinforcing federated learning with dif-
ferential privacy, the foremost attention is given to the client-
level privacy [10], [11]. The goal is to hide the presence of a
single user, or to be more specific, to bound the influence of
any single user on the learning outcome distribution (i.e. the
distribution of the model parameters).
Under the classic DP [10], [11], the privacy is enforced
by clipping all user updates ui to a fixed L2-norm threshold
C and then adding Gaussian noise with the variance C2σ2.
The noise parameter σ is calibrated to bound the privacy
loss in each communication round, and then the privacy
loss is accumulated across the rounds using the moments
accountant [7].
We use the same privacy mechanism, but employ the
Bayesian accounting method instead of the moments accoun-
tant. Intuitively, our accounting method should have a signif-
icant advantage over the moments accountant in the settings
where data is distributed similarly across the users because
in this case their updates would be in a strong agreement. In
order to map the Bayesian differential privacy framework to
this setting, let us introduce some notation.
Let N denote the number of clients in the federated learning
system. Every client i computes and sends to the server a
model update ui ∼ pi(u) drawn from the client’s update
distribution pi(u). Considering individual client distributions
ensures that our approach is applicable to non-i.i.d. settings
that are natural in the federated learning context. Generally,
not all users participate in a given communication round. We
denote the probability of a user i participating in the round by
αi. Thus, the overall update distribution is given by a mixture:
p(u) =
N∑
i=1
αipi(u). (6)
In our experiments, we fix α1 = α2 = . . . = αN = α.
To match the notation above, let wt indicate the privacy-
preserving model update:
wt = A({ui|ui ∈ U(t)}), (7)
where A({ui|ui ∈ U(t)}) = 1|U(t)|
∑
i ui +N (0, C2σ2) in the
case of Gaussian mechanism, and U(t) is the set of updates
from users participating in the round t.
To bound ε and δ of Bayesian differential privacy, one needs
to compute ct(λ) = max{cLt (λ), cRt (λ)}, where
cLt (λ) = logEu
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
,
cRt (λ) = logEu
[
eλDλ+1(qt‖pt)
]
,
and
pt = p(w
(t)|w(t−1),U(t))
qt = p(w
(t)|w(t−1),U(t) \ {u})
Since the randomness of w comes from the subsampled
Gaussian noise mechanism, we use Theorem 3, in combination
with user sampling and the estimator (5) for both expressions,
to obtain cˆt(λ) that upper-bounds ct(λ) with high probability.
Finally, we use Theorems 1 and 2 to compute ε and δ. The
required assumption of exchangeability is naturally satisfied
because users are sampled independently and uniformly.
B. Instance privacy
As noted above, the same privacy mechanism can be used
in conjunction with the moments accountant to get the classic
DP guarantees [10], [11]. In this case, (ε, δ)-DP at the client
level implies the same guarantee at the instance level (i.e.
bounding the influence of a single data point). However, it
does not hold for BDP. Moreover, the same privacy guarantee
may not be meaningful at the instance level. For example,
δ = 10−3 might be reasonable for 100 clients, but if a client
has tens of thousands of data points, it is not a reasonable
failure probability at the data point level.
At the same time, instance privacy is extremely important
in some scenarios. Imagine federated training on medical data
from different hospitals: while a hospital participation may be
public knowledge, individual patients data must be protected
at the highest degree. Another reason for considering instance-
level privacy is that it provides an additional layer of protection
for users in case of an untrusted curator.
In order to get tighter instance privacy guarantees, we
apply the subsampled Gaussian noise mechanism to gradient
computation on user devices. The accounting follows the same
procedure as described above, except that the noise parameter
σ and the sampling probability q may be different, depending
on which of the settings described below is used.
There are two possible accounting schemes:
1) Sequential accounting: Part of the accounting is per-
formed locally on user devices and part on the server. Overall
privacy cost is equivalent to the centralised training with the
data sampling probability q = BiN , where N is the total number
of data points across all users, and Bi is the local batch size.
The process proceeds as follows. At each communication
round, the server sends N to participating clients, every client
performs private gradient updates, computes cˆt(λ), and sends
it to the server. The server then aggregates the sum of cˆt(λ)
from all users. Since the privacy costs are data-dependent, it
is possible to use secure multi-party computation to allow the
server know the sum without learning individual costs.
The disadvantage of this method is that every participating
client learns the total number of data points, and especially
in the settings with a small number of users it may not
be desirable. Furthermore, the obtained bounds apply to the
commonly learnt model but not to the individual updates of
each user, requiring them to maintain a separate local bound.
These issues are addressed by parallel accounting.
2) Parallel accounting: In this scheme, every client com-
putes cˆt(λ) using q = BiNi , where Ni is the local dataset
size of the client. Consequently, since Ni ≤ N , the privacy
costs will be higher. But this is compensated by using parallel
composition instead of sequential: the server aggregates the
maximum of cˆt(λ) over all users. Again, using secure multi-
party computation is possible to prevent the server from
learning individual privacy costs.
Parallel composition is applicable in this scenario because
user updates within a single round are independent. However,
the server needs to sum up maximum privacy costs over the
rounds because updates are dependent on previous rounds.
As we show in Section VI, parallel accounting may require
more communication rounds to converge to the same quality
solution with the same privacy guarantee. The gap is more
notable on non-identically distributed data.
C. Joint privacy
Instance privacy provides tighter and more meaningful guar-
antees for every data point contribution to the trained model.
Nevertheless, there is a downside: adding noise both during
on-device gradient descent as well as during the averaging
phase on the server results in slow convergence or complete
divergence of the federated learning algorithm.
To tackle this problem, we propose joint accounting, where
the noise added on the client side is re-counted towards the
client-level privacy guarantee.
The main idea of joint accounting is that a client update
received by the server is already noisy when instance privacy
is enforced, and instead of adding more noise the server can
re-count existing noise to compute the client-level bound2.
The only problem: the server cannot sample non-private client
updates to estimate ct(λ) because it no longer has access to
their distribution.
Fortunately, the inner expectation in cLt (λ) and c
R
t (λ) can be
computed locally, suggesting the following procedure. Every
client computes Dˆ(t)λ+1 (Eq. 5) with pˆt and qˆt being the private
outcome distributions with and without their entire update.
Then, the server computes M(t), S(t), and cˆt(λ) by simple
averaging. Additionally, one can implement this averaging
step with secure multi-party computation to further privacy
protection. For the moment, however, it can only be used
with FedSGD, and not FedAvg, because every noisy step
in FedAvg would change the point at which the gradient is
computed, potentially leading to a different gradient distribu-
tion or underestimated total noise variance.
2A version of this technique for differential privacy has also been explored
in a master’s thesis project with Nikolaos Tatarakis.
Using joint accounting allows to achieve tight instance and
client privacy guarantees, and at the same time, preserve the
speed of convergence almost at the same level as the client-
privacy-only solution (see Section VI-D).
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we provide results of the experimental
evaluation of our approach. We begin by describing the
datasets we used, as well as the setting details shared by
all experiments. The subsequent structure follows that of the
previous section. We first evaluate the client-level privacy by
comparing accuracy and privacy guarantees of the traditional
DP method [11] to ours (Section VI-B). Then, in Section VI-C,
we perform experiments on the two proposed methods of
instance privacy accounting. Finally, Section VI-D describes
the results of the joint accounting approach.
A. Experimental setup
We perform experiments on two datasets. The first dataset is
MNIST [36]. It is a standard image classification task widely
used in machine learning research. More specifically, it is
a handwritten digit recognition dataset consisting of 60000
training examples and 10000 test examples, each example is
a 28x28 greyscale image. The second is the APTOS 2019
Blindness Detection challenge dataset3 (in figures, tables and
text, we refer to this dataset as Retina or APTOS). It consists
of 3662 retina images taken using fundus photography. The
images are labelled by clinicians to reflect the severity of
diabetic retinopathy on the scale from 0 to 4. Unlike other
datasets commonly evaluated in the privacy literature [7], [10],
[11], this one actually has more serious implications of a
privacy leak.
All experiments have the following general setup. There is a
number of clients (100, 1000, or 10000), each holding a subset
of data, and the server that coordinates federated training of
the shared model. Some setups with a higher number of users
will entail repetition of data, like in [11], which is a natural
scenario in some applications, e.g. shared or very similar
images on different smartphones. In MNIST experiments, each
user holds 600 examples. For the APTOS dataset, we use data
augmentation techniques (e.g. random cropping, resizing, etc.)
to obtain a larger training set, and then split it such that every
client gets ∼350 images.
Testing is performed on the official test split for MNIST,
and on the first 500 samples in case of APTOS.
While the parameters of the training vary based on ex-
periments, the models remain the same. For MNIST, we
use a simple CNN with two convolutional layers and two
fully connected layers (similar to the one described in the
TensorFlow tutorial4). In case of APTOS, due to the small
dataset size and a harder learning task, we employ ResNet-
50 [37] pre-trained on ImageNet [38] and re-train only the last
fully-connected layer of the network. We do not do extensive
3https://www.kaggle.com/c/aptos2019-blindness-detection/overview/
description
4https://www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/images/deep cnn
TABLE I: Accuracy and privacy guarantees (reported as a pair
(ε, δ)) on MNIST, non-i.i.d. setting.
Accuracy Privacy
Clients Baseline DP BDP DP BDP
100 97% 78% 88% (8, 10−3) (4.0,10−3)
1K 98% 95% 96% (3, 10−5) (1.5,10−5)
10K 99% 96% 97% (1, 10−6) (0.6,10−6)
TABLE II: Accuracy and privacy guarantees (reported as a
pair (ε, δ)) on MNIST, i.i.d. setting.
Accuracy Privacy
Clients Baseline DP BDP DP BDP
100 97% 86% 92% (8, 10−3) (2.0,10−3)
1K 98% 97% 97% (3, 10−5) (1.0,10−5)
10K 99% 97% 98% (1, 10−6) (0.5,10−6)
hyper-parameter tuning in general, since we are interested
in relative performance of private models compared to non-
private ones rather than the best classification accuracy, and
thus, our non-private baseline results may not always match
the ones reported in [3]. For the same reason, we restrict the
number of communication rounds (≤ 300) and use FedSGD
instead of FedAvg, although all the methods except for joint
accounting are compatible with FedAvg.
One of the important aspects of federated learning is that
data might not be distributed identically among users. In agree-
ment with previous work [3], [11], we include experiments in
both i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings for MNIST, because it allows
for a natural non-identical split. More specifically, in the i.i.d.
setting, every user is assigned a subset of uniformly sampled
examples. In the non-i.i.d. setting, we follow the same scheme
as [3] and [11]: splitting the dataset on shards of 300 points
within the same class and then assigning 2 random shards to
each client. The scenario of 100 clients with non-identically
distributed data is particularly hard for privacy applications:
there are
(
10
2
)
= 45 possible digit combinations that clients
can hold and only 100 clients, meaning that some clients might
be easily distinguishable by their data distribution. Therefore,
it is important to note that it may not be possible to obtain
a reasonable privacy bound in this scenario without seriously
compromising accuracy.
The privacy accounting is performed by two methods. To
obtain the bounds on ε and δ of differential privacy, we use
the moments accountant [7], the state-of-the-art DP accounting
method. In the case of Bayesian differential privacy, we follow
the technique described in Sections IV and V: we sample a
number of user updates (or gradients for instance privacy),
estimate an upper bound on the privacy cost, and use Chernoff
inequality to compute the corresponding pair of ε, δ.
B. Client privacy
In this experiment, we test adding client privacy the same
way it is done in [10] and [11]. We use Bayesian accounting,
as described in Section V-A, and compare it to the classic
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Fig. 1: Change in ε relative to its initial value for parallel and sequential composition modes of instance privacy in the settings
of 100 and 1000 clients.
TABLE III: Accuracy and privacy guarantees (reported as a
pair (ε, δ)) on APTOS 2019, i.i.d. setting.
Accuracy Privacy
Clients Baseline DP BDP DP BDP
100 70% 60% 65% (8, 10−3) (2.1,10−3)
1K 71% 67% 68% (2, 10−5) (0.5,10−5)
10K 72% 68% 69% (1, 10−6) (0.2,10−6)
differential privacy accounting by the moments accountant [7].
We fix the noise level σ and account DP and BDP in parallel.
Tables I, II, III summarise accuracy and privacy guarantees
obtained in this setting for MNIST (non-i.i.d. and i.i.d.) and
APTOS respectively. The first column indicates the number
of clients, the second—the baseline accuracy of a non-private
federated classifier (models described in the previous section).
The following columns contain accuracy and privacy parame-
ters obtained for private models using the classic DP and BDP.
Despite being trained in parallel, the two techniques may differ
in accuracy because in some cases we do early stopping for
DP to prevent exceeding privacy budget.
In all cases and for all datasets, we observe substantial
benefits of using Bayesian accounting. The accuracy gains are
most notable in the non-i.i.d. setting of MNIST, where our
method can achieve 10% higher accuracy in the 100 clients
setting, because it presents a more difficult learning scenario
as explained in the previous section. The privacy gains are
consistently significant across all datasets and settings, and
taking into account the fact that ε is exponentiated to get
the bound on outcome probability ratios, BDP can reach
e8/e2 ≈ 400 times stronger guarantee. Nevertheless, in the
settings with few clients, even Bayesian differential privacy
does not reach a more comfortable guarantee of ε = 1,
suggesting that a better privacy-accuracy trade-off may not be
feasible due to higher clients identifiability, or that more work
is needed in improving training with noise and developing
novel privacy mechanisms for federated learning.
Importantly, there is no computation or communication
overhead from the users’ point of view in these experiments
since the privacy accounting code is executed on the server.
TABLE IV: Accuracy and privacy guarantees (a pair (ε, δ)),
at instance and client levels, using joint privacy accounting in
the setting of 100 clients.
Accuracy Privacy
Dataset Baseline DP BDP Client Instance
APTOS 2019 70% 42% 64% (1, 10−3)
(0.1, 10−5)MNIST (iid) 97% 15% 74% (2, 10−3)
MNIST (non-iid) 97% 12% 62% (4, 10−3)
C. Instance privacy
As noted in Section V-B, instance privacy is very important
in scenarios like collecting medical data from a number of
hospitals where patient privacy is at least as crucial as hospital
privacy. In this section, we compare two accounting methods
proposed earlier: sequential and parallel accounting.
Depicted in Figure 1 are the curves showing the growth
of ε estimate with communication rounds. We subtracted
the initial value and applied logarithmic scale in order to
better show the difference in the rate of growth. Across all
settings, it can be seen that parallel accounting leads to faster
growth rates, despite the fact that the parallel composition
is more efficient (taking maximum over clients instead of a
sum). This behaviour can be explained by the fact that each
client is unaware of the total dataset size and, having a small
number of data points, is convinced that every data example
has significant influence on the outcome. The unawareness
about other clients in the case of parallel accounting can also
explain the fact that we don’t observe any improvement in
the ε growth rate with increasing the number of clients. The
only exception is the non-i.i.d. MNIST experiment, where the
difference is likely to come from increased stability of training
and decreased gradient variability with more clients.
The main takeaway from this experiment is that it is bene-
ficial to use sequential accounting for privacy of the federated
model whenever communicating the total size of the dataset
to users is acceptable. In other cases, and for personal privacy
accounting in case of the untrusted curator, parallel accounting
can be used, but more noise is necessary for reasonable privacy
guarantees.
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Fig. 2: Test accuracy as a function of a communication round for non-private, client-level-only private, and jointly private
(using either joint or separate accounting) scenarios.
D. Joint privacy
Lastly, we would like to test the proposed method of the
joint accounting of instance-level and client-level privacy and
contrast it to accounting at these two levels separately. We
perform experiments in the same settings as above, fixing the
client privacy at a certain level (ε = 1) and evaluating the
speed and quality of training. We also compare to what can
be achieved by introducing privacy only at the client level.
Figure 2 displays the test accuracy evolution over com-
munication rounds in the setup of 100 clients for APTOS
and 1000 clients for MNIST. The graphs contain curves for
training without privacy, client-level-only privacy, and the two
accounting paradigms: joint and split. As expected, the non-
private training achieves the best accuracy. Nevertheless, in the
i.i.d. setting, client-only private training quickly approaches
non-private training in quality. Notably, training with both
instance and client privacy using the joint accounting performs
nearly as well, while training with the separate accounting
completely fails due to excessive amounts of noise at both
instance and client levels. For the non-i.i.d. setting, private
training is slower, but there is little difference between in-
troducing privacy only at the client level and using the joint
accounting at both levels: after a slightly larger number of
rounds, training with the joint accounting reaches similar
performance. Based on these experiments, we conclude that
by using joint accounting we can introduce instance privacy
on clients and get client-level privacy at almost no cost.
Finally, we evaluate our method in the strong privacy
setting. We set the instance-level privacy to ε = 0.1 and
stop training when the client privacy reaches the level similar
to previous experiments (except APTOS dataset, where we
were able to achieve comparable results with lower privacy
cost), and report the accuracy that can be achieved in this
strict setting. We have also chosen the most difficult scenario
of 100 clients. As seen in Table IV, the algorithm with
differential privacy performs very poorly on APTOS dataset,
and fails to learn on MNIST, in both i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. setting.
Its performance is especially affected by the strict instance
privacy requirement, since such low levels of ε necessitate
large quantities of noise to be added. It is worth noting, that
it might be possible to achieve better results with DP by
performing per-example gradient clipping, as in [7], but we
do not use this technique due to its impracticality.
On the other hand, our approach manages to achieve rea-
sonable accuracy even under such a strong privacy guarantee.
On APTOS dataset, it is just 6% lower than the non-private
baseline, while on MNIST, it correctly classifies more than
70% of the test data in the i.i.d. setting and over 60% in the
non-i.i.d. setting. One could potentially add more noise on
the server and combine the accounting with the instance level
noise to slow down the growth of ε and reach even better
performance, but we leave these experiments for future work.
Both instance and joint privacy accounting add some com-
putation overhead on user devices due to multiple gradient
calculations. However, performing FL routines when devices
are idle and charging, as suggested in [39], alleviates this
problem. Communication overhead is negligible because only
a single floating point number is added to user messages.
VII. CONCLUSION
We employ the notion of (ε, δ)-Bayesian differential pri-
vacy, a relaxation of (ε, δ)-differential privacy, to obtain tighter
privacy guarantees for clients in the federated learning settings.
The main idea of this approach is to utilise the fact that users
come from a certain population with similarly distributed data,
and therefore, their updates will likely be in agreement with
each other. This is a meaningful assumption in many machine
learning scenarios because they target a specific type of data
(e.g. medical images, emails, motion sensor data, etc.). For
example, it may be unjustified to try hiding an absence of an
audio record in a training set for the ECG analysis, since the
probability of it appearing is in fact much smaller than δ.
We adapt an efficient and tight privacy accounting method
for Bayesian differential privacy to the federated setting in
order to estimate client privacy guarantees. Moreover, we
emphasise the importance of instance-level privacy and pro-
pose two variants of privacy accounting at this level. Finally,
we introduce a novel technique of joint accounting suitable
for obtaining privacy guarantees at instance and client levels
jointly from only instance-level noise.
Our evaluation provides evidence that Bayesian differential
privacy is more appropriate for federated learning. First, it
requires significantly less noise to reach the same privacy
guarantees, allowing models to train in fewer communication
rounds. Second, the bounds on privacy budget ε are much
tighter, and thus, more meaningful. When the number of
clients reaches an order of thousands, which is realistic in
many federated learning scenarios, ε can be kept below 1.
Finally, we demonstrate that by using joint accounting we can
get client privacy for free when adding instance privacy. This
way, the privacy budget can be kept close to ε = 1 for client
privacy and ε = 0.1 for instance privacy while maintaining
reasonably high accuracy.
An important future direction of research is automatically
detecting and mitigating scenarios in which tighter privacy
guarantees are inapplicable, such as non-stationary data distri-
butions or datasets with non-exchangeable samples.
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